

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 6047

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENTS OF JULY 28, 1976

(SALT TWO - 1082)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 28, 1976.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
JULY 28, 1976

I

MR. MINISTER:

WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED YOUR STATEMENT OF JULY 21 CONCERNING
THE US DATA BASE PROPOSAL. TODAY I WILL COMMENT ON THE POINTS
YOU HAVE RAISED.

II

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MR. MINISTER, IN YOUR STATEMENT YOU POINTED OUT THAT, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, BOTH SIDES ARE FREE TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THEIR STRATEGIC ARMS BEING LIMITED. THE US IS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THIS, AND CAN SEE NO WAY THAT A COMMON DATA BASE WOULD IMPINGE ON THIS PRINCIPLE. IT IS OUR PROPOSAL THAT THE DATA BASE WOULD RECORD THE NUMBER OF SYSTEMS BY CATEGORY POSSESSED BY EACH SIDE AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, WITH CHANGES REPORTED TWICE A YEAR IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. THERE IS NOTHING IN OUR DATA BASE PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD INHIBIT OR PREVENT EITHER SIDE FROM MAKING CHANGES AT ANY TIME IN THE COMPOSITION OF ITS FORCES, INCLUDING DURING THE PERIODS BETWEEN THE REPORTS IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

YOUR STATEMENT ALSO NOTED THAT THE AIDE MEMOIRE CONTAINS NOTHING PERTAINING TO ANY KIND OF "OTHER UNDERSTANDING" BY THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN THIS REGARD I BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE AIDE MEMOIRE RECORDS THE PRINCIPLES AND ESTABLISHES THE GUIDELINES FOR A NEW AGREEMENT. IMPLICIT IN OUR EFFORTS TO DRAFT AN AGREEMENT BASED UPON THE AIDE MEMOIRE IS THE REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE A CLEAR AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THUS THE DATA BASE PROPOSAL, WHICH ASSURES THAT THE SIDES WILL APPLY ITS PROVISIONS IN A UNIFORM MANNER, IS NOT ONLY CONSISTENT WITH THE AIDE MEMOIRE, BUT REINFORCES ITS BASIC OBJECTIVES.

MR. MINISTER, YOU STATED THAT THE DATA BASE CONCEPT DID NOT CONFIRM WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. DATA BASE IS NO WAY WEAKENS OR RAISES QUESTIONS CONCERNING VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. UNDER THE US PROPOSAL VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL IN FACT BE PERFORMED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. IN THE US VIEW AN AGREED DATA BASE WOULD ASSURE THAT THERE IS A COMMON INTERPRETATION AS TO WHICH SPECIFIC ITEMS OBSERVED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ARE INCLUDED, OR ARE NOT INCLUDED, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

IN YOUR STATEMENT YOU STATED THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, "TAKEN IN THEIR TOTALITY" WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
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OBLIGATIONS BEING ASSUMED BY BOTH SIDES. THE US SHARES THIS VIEW, PROVIDED THAT BOTH SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT AS TO THE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN. IN OUR VIEW A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF DATA BASE IS TO ASSURE THAT THE SIDES ARRIVE AT SUCH A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT.

YOUR STATEMENT NOTED FURTHER THAT, GIVEN A UNIFORM UNDERSTANDING

BY THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITIONS OF ARMS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION UNDER THE AGREEMENT, THERE WOULD BE NO DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN WHAT THE SIDES ACUTALLY POSSESS AND WHAT IS OBSERVED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. MR. MINISTER, I AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT. IN FACT, A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF DATA BASE IS TO CONFIRM THAT THERE IS SUCH A UNIFORM UNDERSTANDING.

MR. MINISTER, YOU NOTED THAT BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A SMOOTH PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT AND WILL CREATE THE NECESSARY STABILITY. IN THIS REGARD WE BOTH RECOGNIZE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT IS CONSIDERABLY MORE COMPLEX THAN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THUS, A PURPOSE OF OUR DATA BASE PROPOSAL IS TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION IN CARRYING OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THIS MORE COMPLEX AGREEMENT.

YOUR STATEMENT CONTENDED THAT ESTABLISHING A DATA BASE WOULD CREATE "COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED DIFFICULTIES FOR THE DELEGATIONS". I DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. WORK ON THE DATA BASE WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN PARALLEL WITH OUR PRESENT EFFORT. IT SHOULD PRESENT FEW COMPLICATIONS AND SHOULD IN NO WAY SLOW THE PACE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW AGREEMENT.

FINALLY, YOUR STATEMENT SAID THAT THE SIDES HAVE COME CLOSER TOGETHER IN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A PRECEDENT FOR DATA BASE. IN THIS REGARD THE US SIDE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ILLUSTRATES HOW THE SIDES IN FACT USED AN EXCHANGE OF DATA IN NEGOTIATING THAT AGREEMENT.

III

MR. MINISTER, I HOPE MY RESPONSE TO YOUR STATEMENT WILL
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CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PURPOSE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE US PROPOSAL. AS I HAVE STATED BEFORE, IT IS THE US VIEW THAT MUTUALLY AGREED UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR FURTHER COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 6047

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

JULY 28, 1976

MR. MINISTER:

I

ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS OUR TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS ON HOW TO DESCRIBE ICBMS OTHER THAN HEAVY ICBMS. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE REASONS WHY THE UNITED STATES PREFERS THE USE OF THE TERM "NON-HEAVY" VERSUS THE TERM "LIGHT". IN SPITE OF THAT PREFERENCE, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO MAKE A PROPOSAL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH WE HOPE WILL RESOLVE THE ISSUE.

II

OUR PROPOSAL IS THAT, IF THE SIDES CAN OTHERWISE ARRIVE AT AGREEMENT ON LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE II, WHICH DEFINES HEAVY ICBMS, AND FOR PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE IV, WHICH PLACES A CEILING ON THE LAUNCH-WEIGHT AND THROW-WEIGHT OF HEAVY ICBMS, AND IF WE CAN WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF
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THROW-WEIGHT, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE USE OF THE TERM "LIGHT" IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE II AND ELSEWHERE, AS APPROPRIATE, IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

I UNDERSTAND THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS PROPOSAL, THE SIDES IN THE DRAFTING WORKING GROUP HAVE TABLED IDENTICAL TEXTS FOR PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE II, IN WHICH HEAVY ICBMS ARE DEFINED AS "ANY ICBMS WHICH HAVE A LAUNCH-WEIGHT GREATER OR A THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE HEAVIEST, IN TERMS OF EITHER LAUNCH-WEIGHT OR THROW-WEIGHT, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE LIGHT ICBMS DEPLOYED BY EITHER PARTY AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT." IT IS ALSO MY UNDERSTANDING THAT, IN THE SAME CONTEXT, THE SIDES IN THE DRAFTING WORKING GROUP HAVE TABLED IDENTICAL LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE IV, IN WHICH "THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY ICBMS WHICH HAVE A LAUNCH-WEIGHT GREATER OR A THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE HEAVIEST, IN TERMS OF EITHER LAUNCH-WEIGHT OR THROW-WEIGHT, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE HEAVY ICBMS DEPLOYED BY EITHER PARTY AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT."

IN THE SAME CONTEXT, THE SIDES IN THE DRAFTING WORKING GROUP HAVE ALSO TABLED IDENTICAL LANGUAGE FOR AN AGREED STATEMENT IN WHICH THE THROW-WEIGHT OF AN ICBM IS DEFINED AS "THE SUM OF THE WEIGHT OF: (A) ITS REENTRY VEHICLE OR REENTRY VEHICLES; (B) ANY SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS OR OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICES FOR TARGETING ONE REENTRY VEHICLE, OR FOR RELEASING OR FOR DISPENSING AND TARGETING TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES; AND (C) ITS PENETRATION AIDS, INCLUDING DEVICES FOR THEIR RELEASE."

IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREED STATEMENT DEFINING THROW-WEIGHT, THE UNITED STATES STATED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO MAKE CLEAR THE MEANING OF THE TERM "OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICES". OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE TEXT OF THIS COMMON UNDERSTAND IS:

"THE SIDES AGREE THAT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD REFLECTS THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PHRASE 'OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICES', AS USED IN THE DEFINITION OF THROW-WEIGHT IN THE AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE II, MEANS ANY DEVICES, OTHER THAN SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS, FOR RELEASING OR FOR SECRET

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DISPENSING AND TARGETING TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES; AND ANY DEVICES FOR TARGETING ONE REENTRY VEHICLE WHICH CANNOT PROVIDE MORE THAN 15 PER CENT OF THE TOTAL VELOCITY ACQUIRED BY THE REENTRY VEHICLE."

WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT A COMMON UNDERSTANDING SUCH AS THIS IS NECESSARY TO DRAW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN A FINAL BOOST STAGE AND AN "OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICE" IN THE CASE OF A MISSILE WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE. THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT THIS DISTINCTION BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL VELOCITY ACQUIRED BY THE REENTRY VEHICLE.

HOWEVER, WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER OTHER APPROACHES FOR
MAKING THIS DISTINCTION.

WITH RESPECT TO LAUNCH-WEIGHT, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SIDES
IN THE DRAFTING WORKING GROUP HAVE TABLED IDENTICAL TEXTS FOR A
SECOND AGREED STATEMENT IN WHICH "THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE
LAUNCH-WEIGHT OF AN ICBM IS THE WEIGHT OF THE FULLY LOADED
MISSILE ITSELF AT THE TIME OF LAUNCH."

III

MR. MINISTER, IN OFFERING TO THE USE OF THE TERM
"LIGHT" IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE II, I AGAIN WANT TO MAKE CLEAR
THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT CONSIDER ALL SO-CALLED "LIGHT" ICBMS AS
COMPARABLE. THUS, I WANT TO NOTE THAT WE MAY RETURN TO THE
QUESTION OF MISSILE CLASSIFICATION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 6047

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

JULY 28, 1976

MR. MINISTER,

I

TODAY I WANT TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO RESPOND TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF JULY 14 RELATIVE TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI AND THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED STATEMENT.

II

AS YOU KNOW, IN NOVEMBER OF 1975, THE US OFFERED TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET FORMULATION FOR THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI PROVIDED AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON AN AGREED STATEMENT DEFINING THE TERM "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES". SUBSEQUENT TO THAT PROPOSAL OUR TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE HAD NUMEROUS EXCHANGES IN AN ATTEMPT TO ARRIVE AT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREED STATEMENT.

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MUCH OF OUR DISCUSSION HAS BEEN OVER THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO INCLUDE "MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING" IN THE DEFINITION OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES.

IT IS THE US VIEW THAT VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH A NUMBER OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL DEPEND ON MONITORING ACTIVITIES DURING THE TESTING PHASE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES DURING THE TESTING PHASE. THEREFORE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES BE DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO INCLUDE MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDE VERIFICATION.

III

MR. MINISTER, AT OUR MEETING OF JULY 14 YOU PRESENTED A NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI AND FOR THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED STATEMENT. IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL YOU OUTLINED THE SOVIET VIEWS REGARDING VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT DURING THE TESTING PHASE. I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO TESTING IN ITS PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, JAMOR DIFFERENCES STILL EXIST BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ON THIS QUESTION.

UNDER THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES" ARE DEFINED AS "SPECIAL MEASURES CARRIED OUT DELIBERATELY TO HINDER OR DELIBERATELY TO IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING". I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT YOUR NEW PROPOSAL NO LONGER DEFINES DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES AS MEASURES "FOR HIDING OR CAMOUFLAGING". AS YOU KNOW, IS IS THE US VIEW THAT THE TERM "CONCEALMENT", AS USED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF

ARTICLE XVI, MUST BE UNDERSTOOD TO EMBRACE A BROADER SPECTRUM OF ACTIVITIES THAN "HIDING OR CAMOUFLAGING".

INSOFAR AS THE WORD "SPECIAL" IS CONCERNED, THE US CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT MEASURES CARRIED OUT DELIBERATELY TO HINDER OR DELIBERATELY TO IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS SHOULD BE PROHIBITED EVEN THOUGH THEY MIGHT NOT BE UNDERTAKEN EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PURPOSE. FOR THIS REASON THE US VIEW IS THAT THE QUALIFYING EXPRESSION "SPECIAL" IS UNDERSIRABLE.

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IN ADDITION, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SOVIET TERM "PROVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING" IS INTENDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE SAME PURPOSE AS THE US TERM "MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING". IT IS THE US POSITION THAT, WHETHER OR NOT TESTING IS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN A PARTICULAR PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT, PROHIBITION OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES SHOULD APPLY TO THE TESTING OF ARMS THE OBSERVATION OF WHICH IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OR PROHIBITIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND FURTHER, IF SUBJECT TO THOSE LIMITATIONS, WHICH LIMITATIONS.

IV

THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD SPECIFICALLY EXEMPT "CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES" FROM THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI AND, IN ADDITION, WOULD EXEMPT "METHODS OF TRANSMITTING TELEMETRIC INFORMATION DURING TESTING".

ONE REASON THE US CANNOT AGREE TO AN EXEMPTION FOR "CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES" IS THAT AT THE TEST RANGE WHERE ONE OF THE NEW SOVIET ICBMS IS BEING TESTED, MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN WHICH DELIBERATELY CONCEAL AND THEREBY IMPEDE ASSOCIATION OF THAT MISSILE WITH ITS LAUNCHER. IF "CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES" WERE EXEMPTED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI, THIS PRACTICE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

A SECOND REASON WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET-PROPOSED EXEMPTION OF "CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES" INVOLVES THE TELEMETRY ISSUE WHICH YOU RAISED IN YOUR JULY 14 STATEMENT.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE TELEMETRY ISSUE, THE US BELIEVES THAT DATA TRANSMISSION TECHNIQUES CAN DELIBERATELY IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, THE US BELIEVES THAT THIS PROPOSED EXEMPTION IN THE AGREED STATEMENT IS CONTRADICTORY TO THE OBLIGATION IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI NOT TO USE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE

PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE US CANNOT
ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT "METHODS OF TRANSMITTING TELE-
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METRIC INFORMATION DURING TESTING" NOT BE CONSIDERED SUBJECT TO
THE PROHIBITION ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES.

V

WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL REGARDING THE TESTING
OF PENETRATION AIDS, THE US BELIEVES THAT THE TESTING OF PENE-
TRATION AIDS WOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED BY A PROHIBITION ON DELIBERATE
CONCEALMENT MEASURES.

VI

MR. MINISTER, TODAY I HAVE COMMENTED ON YOUR JULY 14 PROPOSAL
REGARDING DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES AND HAVE EXPRESSED THE
US VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS. I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR
FURTHER VIEWS ON THIS. JOHNSON

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